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 Access to EU political institutions: 
Political leaders and working groups 
Abstract 
The paper analyses the access of interest organizations to the EU institutions drawing on 
data from 800 business interest associations and 34 large firms. It argues that these contact 
patterns derive from the salience of the contacts for the political actors and the interest 
groups, the opportunities enshrined in the EU institutional setting, and the characteristics of 
the interest organizations. Replicating the design of previous access studies, the analysis 
yields other empirical results than these and traces the differences to the different types of 
data that have been used in the studies. The study identifies a differential access of EU 
associations, large firms, and national associations to the EU institutions and points to 
important variations between the working level of these institutions and their political 
leadership.  
 
Introduction 
The relations among the EU institutions and business interest groups have become a major 
element in the governance of the European Union. Many scholars consider the access of 
interest groups to the EU institutions as important because systematic variations in these 
access patterns can result in biased politics. Thus, finding an elitist bias in these contact 
patterns, Thomas Hueglin (1999: 260) transferred Ernst E. Schattschneider’s well-known 
comment on the political process in the United States to the European Union: ‘the heavenly 
chorus sings with a strong upper class accent’. David Coen (1997, 1998) arrives at the same 
conclusion when characterizing the EU patterns of interest intermediation as a form of ‘elite 
pluralism’ (see also Cowles 2001). The systematic analysis of these access patterns is all the 
more important because, according to Liesbet Hooghe’s study of the European Commission, 
its officials maintain almost as many contacts with interest organizations as with Members of 
the European Parliament (MEP) or with officials in the Council of the EU. The Commission 
officials are only more often in touch with national civil servants than with business interest 
groups (Hooghe 2001: 64-65). They are also more frequently in touch with business interests 
than with diffuse interests. 
  2It is therefore puzzling that there are only few studies that systematically analyze the access 
of interest groups to the EU institutions. In their seminal study of European interest group 
politics at the beginning of the 1970s, Jean Meynaud and Dusan Sidjanski (1971: 491-638) 
outlined the contours of a ‘morphologie d’accès’ to the European institutions that already 
expressed what has become the conventional wisdom about these contact patterns: Among 
the various routes that the interest organizations could take to influence the institutions of the 
early European Communities, they highlighted the importance of the Commission for the 
interest organizations and pointed out that the access to the Council of the EC occurs for the 
most part indirectly, by national interest organizations via those national departments that are 
in charge of the policy dossier and send their experts in the Council working groups. Interest 
groups would only rarely seek and obtain access to the Council as a collective decision 
making body. Given that the European Parliament had then only a consultative status in the 
formulation of EU policies and was composed of national parliamentarians, they (1971: 577-
586) ranked it, together with the Economic and Social Committee, only as an institution of 
secondary importance to interest organizations. A large part of the relatively few contacts 
with the members of the European Parliament would come about through initiatives taken by 
national associations rather than by Eurogroups.  
In recent years, and based on an analysis of the financial sector, Pieter Bouwen (2002a, b) 
has put forward a parsimonious explanation of these access patterns. He suggests that the 
‘organizational form’ matters most when the access of interest organizations to the EU 
institutions is to be explained. He compares the access of three forms of organizations: firms, 
EU associations, and national associations.
1 According to him, these types of organizations 
differ in the number of contacts with the EU political institutions because they can deliver 
different ‘access goods’. He singles out (2002b: 11-12) the information that interest 
organizations can provide (see also Crombez 2002). The argument is that the three types of 
organization differ in their capacity to deliver specific kinds of information to EU policy-
makers: Supposedly, firms are best at delivering expert knowledge about markets and 
technologies, EU associations control information about the so-called ‘encompassing 
European interest’ of their members, and national associations command information about 
the ‘encompassing national interest’ of their members. He does not analyze empirically 
whether the organizations are in control of these access goods but investigates the contact 
patterns of EU politicians and officials with these organizations as an empirical test for his 
  3propositions. His analysis builds on interviews with Members of the European Parliament as 
well as officials of the Commission and the Council of the EU who indicated the frequency of 
their interactions with firms, EU associations, national associations, and political consultants. 
This empirical evidence is important, but also piecemeal. It draws only on evidence provided 
by the demand-side, it is based on a single economic sector, it disregards variations among 
the firms and among the associations, and it neglects explanatory factors beyond the 
expertise of the interest organizations. It also aggregates contacts at different levels of the 
political institutions. In this article, I intend to broaden the study of the access patterns by 
drawing on data from interest groups that operate in different economic sectors, considering 
cross-national variations, and looking at different levels of the state institutions, namely the 
level of the political leadership and the working levels.  
I argue that the access patterns are shaped by the salience of the contacts, the institutional 
opportunities, and the capacities of the interest organizations. In this study, I replicate some 
elements of Pieter Bouwen’s study by comparing the mean access of the interest 
organizations to the EU institutions. Then, I validate the outcome of this analysis by studying 
in more detail the relations that have emerged among state and business at the EU level. 
Information provided by firms and associations about their access to EU policy-makers 
serves to test the reliability of the previous study. The outcome puts into question some of its 
findings that build on interviews with EU bureaucrats and politicians. I then set out to explain 
the different results of the two studies, tracing them in part to the different data that have 
been employed.  
The politics of access in the European Union 
Access to the EU institutions: salience, opportunities, and capacities 
I define access as the frequency of contacts between interest organizations and EU 
institutions. This definition emphasizes that interest organizations obtain contacts with EU 
political institutions and do not just aim at them or forego their access opportunities. It 
excludes indirect ways and means to exert influence on policy-makers via the public or the 
media. Therefore, the access concept is better suited to study the representation of interests 
by business which is said to pursue insider strategies and seek face-to-face negotiations with 
policy-makers than the activities of social movements for which the mobilization of the media 
and public is more common. This access concept implies either a successful attempt of an 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
1   To some extent, Bouwen also considers the professional consultancies, but less systematically than the other three 
forms of organization so that I do not consider them here.   
  4interest group to approach the EU institutions or the incorporation of an interest group into 
EU policy-making by these institutions. Disentangling the contacts between state and 
business from their initiators, it captures strategic choices on part of the political elites. I 
argue that political access results from the salience of these contacts for the interest groups 
and the political institutions, the political opportunities enshrined in the institutional structure, 
and, finally, from the organizational capacities of the interest organizations.  
Salience and political exchange 
The salience of the contacts is rooted in resource dependencies among state institutions and 
interest groups. None of them can autonomously pursue and achieve their political goals. 
Hence, the access patterns cannot be fully understood without an exchange paradigm. The 
EU institutions depend on interest groups for their information, for their consent, or their 
active cooperation. As their regulatory tasks generate a huge demand for information and 
cooperation (Meynaud and Sidjanski 1971: 523; Majone 1989: 163), some authors maintain 
that the political money in the EU is information (Bouwen 2002a, b). Actors use their 
information strategically to achieve outcomes that are closest their own preferences 
(Crombez 2002). The ensuing information exchange increases the knowledge of the actors 
about EU policies and their consequences, and it also reduces the uncertainty about the 
positions and strategies of other actors. This can sometimes promote an understanding of 
each other’s position even though it does not necessarily facilitate an agreement.  
Some organizational features make for the dependence of the EU institutions on external 
advice: in relation to their Europe-wide tasks, they have only limited resources at their 
disposal. Being detached from the implementation of EU policies on domestic grounds, they 
are in need of information that enables them to devise policy proposals that solve the 
problems at hand, can be administered by the members states, and win a sufficient majority 
among the legislators in the Parliament and the Council (Meynaud and Sidjanski 1971: 552; 
Mazey and Richardson 2002: 148).  
The EU institutions have recourse to several sources of information. International 
organizations, member state administrations, think tanks, interest organizations, and 
scientific experts give important policy advice. This reduces the risk that actors withhold or 
manipulate information. The incentives to retain information or provide false or are further 
reduced by the fact that many actors are involved in a series of policy games in which their 
reputation may suffer if they have proven to be unreliable. Now, firms and business interest 
associations are particularly important sources of information because in the area market 
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policy-makers appreciate their technical and economic information as well as their knowledge 
about the preferences of their members.  
Given that EU policies have long centered around market integration, the European 
institutions consider their involvement in the development of EU policies essential. Business 
interests seek access to the EU institutions to receive information about the development of 
EU policies and wield influence over them in negotiations with the state institutions. James Q. 
Wilson (1980) has pointed out that individuals, groups, and firms are motivated to respond to 
regulatory policies because they must either carry their costs or may obtain substantial 
benefits from them. In his theory of the European regulatory state, Giandomenico Majone 
stresses the costs of EU regulation that fall upon firms and individuals (1996). Usually, 
business interest organizations seek direct access to policy-makers in order to wield 
influence over public decisions (Wilson 1973). However, having access to the EU institutions 
does not imply that these contacts change the course of events. Even many discussions with 
EU policy-makers may not bring about the desired results. Even if EU politicians take 
business concerns into consideration in EU legislation, this is not necessarily a consequence 
of their interactions with business organizations. It may simply be the result of convergent 
policy preferences. What is more, in some instances EU institutions may even co-opt interest 
organizations in order to pursue their own policy preferences.  
In short, access is not equal to influence in the sense that the input of interest organizations 
shapes the substance of EU policies. However, several scholars argue that there is a positive 
relation among the access of interest organizations to EU policy-makers and their influence 
on EU policies (see Meynaud and Sidjanski 1971: 465; Beyers 2002). Those organizations 
that are regularly in touch with EU officials and politicians are well positioned in the EU policy 
process. They are usually well informed about EU policy-making and can process this 
information to their members whereas those organizations that are only infrequently in touch 
with the EU institutions lack that information and depend on other interest groups or national 
institutions to deliver it to them. Everything else being equal, it is likely that the regular 
contact partners of the EU institutions are also important coalition partners of other interest 
organizations because they are in a better position to exert influence on EU policies. In sum, 
the study of the access pattern serves to identify the features of those organizations that 
assume crucial positions in EU policy networks as well as important patterns of the political 
process in the European Union. 
  6The institutional opportunities  
While the salience of the contacts motivates interest groups and EU institutions to exchange 
information and negotiate with their counterparts, the institutional setting defines the 
opportunities of interest organizations to get in touch with the EU decision makers. Earlier 
studies illustrated that the European multi-level system offers interest organizations multiple 
points of access (Pollack 1997; Grande 1994; Marks and McAdam 1996). As Meynaud and 
Sidjanski have argued: ‘la configuration et l’importance respective des accès dépendent du 
pouvoir officiel de décision depuis le stade de l’élaboration initiale jusqu’à celui de l’adoption 
finale’ (1971: 468). This article limits its attention to the institutional opportunity structure at 
the EU level.  
The EU is marked by its pronounced institutional segmentation (see Peters 1992). In the first 
pillar of the EU, the European Community, interest groups enjoy relatively good access to the 
European institutions. This is less so in the other two pillars of the European Union which 
cover the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and police and judicial co-operation in 
criminal matters. These two pillars operate more intergovernmentally, and, as such, involve 
much less input from the Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Courts. 
This allows member governments to prevent interest groups from gaining access to the EU 
policy process. For most interest groups, then, the EC pillar provides the greatest potential 
for access to the EU institutions, not least because it comprises the vast majority of the 
Union’s regulatory and distributive policies. Therefore, the subsequent analysis concentrates 
on the European Community. 
Enjoying a monopoly over policy initiation in this pillar and being granted a crucial role in 
agenda setting and policy formulation, the European Commission is considered to be the 
most important point of contact for interest groups in the EC (Coen 2002: 263-264; Mazey 
and Richardson 2002: 135-136). It has also acquired important powers under the so-called 
delegated legislation in policy implementation which comprises the large majority of EU legal 
acts.
2 Many interest organizations underline that is difficult to obtain substantial modifications 
of a Commission proposal once it has been presented to the European Parliament and the 
Council of the European Union (Meynaud and Sidjanski 1971: 550). It is not uncommon that 
the final Council decision is largely identical to the proposed text. Therefore, it is important for 
interest organizations to take action before the Commission has formed its opinion and 
                                                       
2   According to Rinus Van Schendelen (2002: 63-64), 82 per cent of the EU legal acts in the year 2000 were matters 
of delegated legislation in the comitology system of the EU. Only 18 per cent fell under the secondary legislation upon 
which the Council, and, depending on the decision-making procedure, the European Parliament decide.  
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monitoring the compliance with Community law by member-states and nonstate (or private) 
actors. The Commissioners are its most senior officials and nominated by the member state 
governments subject to a vote of approval by the European Parliament. Even though the 
Commission exercises its powers collectively, it is rarely approached as a collegiate body. 
Being organized into several Directorates-General (DGs) each of which is responsible for 
specific policy areas, interest groups tend to maintain relations with one or more of these 
DGs. The Commission has developed elaborate standard operating procedures and 
strategies to incorporate them into EU policy-making. The central role of the European 
Commission in EC policy formulation leads to the first hypothesis :  
H 1   Interest  organizations  maintain  more contacts with the Commission than with the 
other EU institutions. 
The European Parliament (EP) is the EU institution that has changed the most over time. 
Being initially a consultative body, it has acquired substantial legislative powers and ‘is now a 
force to be reckoned with across a wide range of policy domains’ (Wallace 2005: 65). 
Nonetheless, even now, the EP is often held to be less important to interest groups than the 
Council or the Commission because its influence varies greatly according to the issue at 
hand and the decision-making procedure that applies. Since they are nominated by national 
parties and elected by national voters, the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are 
said to be more amenable to national pressures than the Commission and also more open to 
diffuse or public interests, including those representing the environment, consumers, or large 
groups such as the unemployed and pensioners. As a consequence, some analysts regard 
the links forged between interest groups and MEPs as ‘coalitions of the weak’ (Kohler-Koch 
1997: 6–7). According to Mazey and Richardson (1993: 12), the normal pattern for producer 
groups is still to see the EP ’very much as a secondary arena’. In general, the heads of the 
Standing Committees and the rapporteurs  who draft the EP amendments to EU policy 
proposals are considered to be the most important addressees for interest group demands.  
The interest groups don’t find it easy to access the relevant actors in the EP because its 
members commute between Strasbourg, Brussels and their electoral districts and the 
parliamentary majorities are more unstable than in the member states. The EP is organized 
in party groupings of which the largest and most important are the European People’s Party 
and the European Socialists. In many issues, the rules of the EU legislative process 
prescribe an absolute majority in the parliament and make necessary or, for that matter, 
  8facilitate an informal grand coalition of the two large parliamentary parties (Hix 2005). 
However, given the lack of party-political discipline that emerges, in general, in parliamentary 
systems where the parliamentary majority supports the government that is in charge, in the 
EP, the importance of territorial, institutional, party-political, and issue-specific decision 
criteria varies to a greater extent. 
Owing to its pivotal position, the Council of the EU is a highly relevant point of access for 
interest groups and consists of a series of specialized councils in different issue areas. The 
main legislator of EU policies consists of ministers from the national governments. Its 
meetings and the common decisions are prepared by the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (Coreper I and II) that consists of the heads and deputies of the member 
states' permanent representations in Brussel, and the numerous Council Working Groups 
that are composed, for the most part, of national experts. Given its relatively few meetings in 
Brussels, the Council and its administrative machinery are rarely lobbied in Brussels. Rather, 
domestic interest groups tend to address their concerns to particular government 
departments, representing their specific interests at national level. While the Council’s policy 
positions evolve along national lines, in part as a consequence of pressure by domestic 
interests, the European Council is more removed from interest group pressure. Not only does 
it comprise the heads of state and government (as well as the President of the Commission), 
thus representing the general interest to a greater degree, but it also meets formally only 
once every six months, lessening its impact on the minutiae of day-to-day politics in the EU. 
Therefore, the analysis concentrates on the EU Council. The second hypothesis is:  
H 2   Interest  organizations  maintain  more  contacts with the European Parliament than 
with the Council of the European Union.  
In general, it can be expected that the interest organizations have more frequent interactions 
with the working level of the EU institutions than with their political leadership. European 
integration consists largely of technical details that are put in place by a technico-
bureaucratic structure (Mazey and Richardson 2002: 136). The desk officers in the 
Commission and in the Council working groups as well as the rapporteurs of the EP 
committees are responsible for drafting the policy proposals or sorting out their details. It is 
estimated that some 70 per cent of Council texts are agreed in its working groups, another 15 
per cent in Coreper or other senior committees, which leaves only some 10-15 per cent to the 
ministers (Wallace 2005: 58). Accordingly, the bureaucratic staff depends heavily on the 
information and the support of the interest organizations. In contrast, the attention of the 
  9Commissioners and the Ministers is usually not directed towards all policy details but focused 
on those aspects of an EU directive that are contested or that are considered to be 
particularly important. On the part of the interest groups, lobbying them aims either at 
establishing broad policy principles – such as the attempts of the European Roundtable of 
Industrialists to mobilize support for the Internal Market Program amongst the member state 
governments (see Cowles 1997) –, at revising decisions that were taken before in the policy 
process – such as the German Chanceller Schröder’s well-known intervention in favor of the 
Volkswagen AG –, or at raising the stakes in favor of a specific policy alternative rather than 
others. Hence, less frequent access to the political leadership does not imply that these 
contacts are less important for interest groups than those at the working level. 
H 3   Interest organizations maintain more contacts with position holders at the working 
level of the European institutions than with their political leadership.  
As the EU judiciary, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) monitors compliance with and 
interprets EU law. European law takes precedence over national law and grants rights to 
individual citizens that the national courts must uphold. As a consequence, the preliminary 
rulings procedure, which offers a channel for national courts to refer questions of European 
law to the ECJ, allows interest groups to challenge the compatibility of domestic and EU law. 
However, in practice, to take a case to the European Court usually demands that a body of 
EU law already exists. And even where this is the case, the outcome of such action is 
uncertain, the financial costs heavy, and the duration of the case generally lengthy, which 
means that this avenue is clearly not available to all citizens and interest groups, and will only 
be worthwhile when the stakes are felt to be especially high.  
Finally, the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) is a distinctive institution in this context, 
as it was set up to channel the opinions of organized interests within the European policy 
process. However, as this tripartite body has only consultative rights in EU legislation, it is 
generally considered to be of marginal importance for the representation of interests. Direct 
contacts between the EU institutions and interest organizations are now much more 
important than this institutionalized forum for interest intermediation. 
Organizational form and organizational capacities 
This section explores the proposition that different forms of organizations vary significantly in 
their access to the EU institutions, comparing large firms, EU associations, and national 
associations. It is trivial to state that not all firms are equally well equipped to take political 
  10action at the EU level. To a large extent, a firm’s dependence on associations and its 
capacity to act individually at EU level is determined by its size (see Coen 1997, 1998). Small 
firms tend to rely on their national and European associations to represent their interests 
because they do not have the resources to sustain substantial public affairs capacities. 
Lacking also investment power, they must unite to gain political clout. In contrast, large firms 
control substantial economic resources that allow them to act unilaterally and turn them into 
relevant interlocuters for state actors.  
It is interesting to note that, despite these capacities, many large European firms relied on 
national lobbying. Several firms were national champions (see also Hayward 1995) that had 
either been nationalized or received a preferential treatment at the domestic level. Many firms 
were not only preoccupied with regaining their national market in the 1950s and 1960s, but 
enjoyed also excellent access to their national governments which would see after their 
interests in the European arena and could veto European policies that ran against them. 
Moreover, initially, the Commission had a distinct preference for consulting community-wide 
interest organizations rather than national associations or firms so that it would not need to 
arbitrate amongst different national points of view and might even find an integrationist 
perspective in the interest group proposal (Meynaud and Sidjanski 1970: 394-395).  
Notably, the firms responded to the threats and opportunities enshrined in two broad 
regulatory initiatives in the 1970s and 1980s: On the one hand, they mobilized against 
European social regulation and the efforts to introduce regulations for Works Councils in 
multinational firms by the end of the 1970s (Vredeling directive), and, on the other hand, they 
supported EU market integration and the Internal Market Program when they were facing the 
European economic crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s and growing international 
competition (Sandholtz and Zysman 1989). The failure of national government programs to 
address these problems provided incentives for European big business to organize at the 
European level (Cowles 1997).  
Given the economic and political ‘Eurosclerosis’, the Commission also reviewed its stance on 
the involvement of firms in the making of economic policies. It started to work directly with a 
number of firms to find solutions for the problems plaguing industrial sectors such as the steel 
industry and to devise research and technology policy programs for the European High Tech 
industries (Sandholtz 1992; Grande 1993) Meanwhile, there are several important examples 
for the emergence of Commission bodies that brought together Central Executive Officers 
(CEO) from large firms: e.g., the Competitiveness Advisory Group, the Bangemann Group in 
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on international regulatory issues (see Coen 2002; Cowles 2001). 
As a consequence of the increasingly felt political weight of the European institutions and the 
loss of their governments’ veto powers in the Council due to the Single European Act and 
subsequent treaty reforms, the firms pressed also for changes of the membership direct 
membership and participation in the committee work.  Nowadays, several direct membership 
organizations at the European level exclude national associations, such as the Roundtable of 
European Industrialists that consists of roughly 50 Central Executive Officers of large 
European companies  (Cowles 1997, Coen 2002). The public affairs activities of the firms 
have also become more professional including greater attempts to coordinate the lobbying 
efforts of international subsidiaries and the establishment of public affairs offices in Brussels. 
 In light of these developments, some analysts claim that the European Commission has 
come to work more closely with large firms than with associations (Coen 2002; Cowles 2001) 
labeling this a form of ‘elite pluralism’ in the European Union. To the EU institutions, it can be 
important that associations do not exert direct control over the economic resources of their 
members whereas large firms command tremendous investment power. Furthermore, their 
economic and technical knowledge is usually closer to the market than that of associations 
(Mazey and Richardson 2002)  As they are also important players in their home markets, 
large firms may also serve the EU institutions as avenues to exert influence on national 
governments. Maria Green Cowles highlights the role of the European Round Table of 
Industrialists and its CEO members in persuading national governments of the benefits of the 
Internal Market Programme (1997). In sum, there are good reasons to believe that large firms 
have better access to the EU institutions than other interest organizations and that a form of 
elite pluralism has emerged in the EU..  
H 4   Large firms have better access to the EU institutions than associations.  
Similarly, not all business associations will have equal access to the EU institutions. In 
particular, their location in the EU multilevel setting shapes the political activities of business 
associations. It is unlikely that domestic groups will be equally active at the EU and the 
national levels of government. These organizations are embedded in domestic structures and 
social relations and depend on the routine exchanges with domestic partners from whom 
they extract resources (see Wilson 1973). Only if the EU regulation has an important impact 
on them and their members, if the division of labor among them and those EU associations 
which represent them in EU politics is unsatisfactory, or if the terms of EU policy 
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EU level. Hence, national associations concentrate on domestic institutions whereas EU 
associations focus on EU institutions.  
H  5    EU business associations maintain more contacts with the EU institutions than 
national business associations.  
I assume that theses expectations (H 4 and H 5) hold across the institutions. Hence; I do not 
agree with the proposition that the relative access of firms, national associations, and EU 
interest groups varies across the Council, the Parliament, and the Commission because 
these institutions are in need of different exchange goods (Bouwen 2002a, 2002b: 13-16). 
According to that reasoning, the Commission would depend mostly on the expert knowledge 
that firms possess about markets and technologies because it helps it to promote European 
policies. Given that it must ensure the support for its policy proposals in the other EU 
institutions and amongst interest groups, it would also be interested in the information EU 
associations can provide about the ‘European encompassing interest’. Only then is it short in 
supply of the knowledge national associations possess about the ‘domestic encompassing 
interest’. Given that it is a supranational institution whose members are responsible to 
national voters and that it must scrutinize and modify (or reject) the Commission proposals 
and seek consensus with the Council, the European Parliament would seem to be mostly 
interested in the information EU associations provide about the encompassing European 
interest, followed by the knowledge of national associations about their domain. Finally, in the 
EU institutional framework, the EU Council is the most intergovernmental institution whose 
task it is to amend the Commission proposals and decide upon them. It would therefore be 
most interested in the information about the ‘domestic encompassing interest' that national 
associations can provide. Given that the national governments usually seek to reach 
consensus in the Council and must also find a consensus with the parliament when the co-
decision procedure applies, the Council is also in need of some information about the 
‘European encompassing interest’. Table 1 summarizes the expected rank order of the 
contacts that the interest organizations maintain with EU institutions. 
In the empirical analysis, Bouwen (2002b: 24) does not find support for his hypothesized rank 
orders: First, EU associations maintain more contacts with the Commission than firms, and 
these have more frequent access to the supranational bureaucracy than national 
associations. The conclusion would be that the European Commission is more dependent on 
the European encompassing interest than on expert knowledge about markets. Second, 
  13European associations do not have significantly more contacts with the EP than national 
associations, but both maintain more contacts with MEPs than large firms do. It follows that 
the European Parliament demands as much information about the European encompassing 
interest as about the national encompassing interests but depends less on the firms’ expert 
knowledge about markets. Thirdly, national associations have the best access to the Council 
of the EU, closely followed by firms. EU associations have clearly less access. Thus, the 
Council members are mostly interested in the domestic consequences of EU policies, and 
then they depend on market knowledge provided by firms. The subsequent section analyzes 
whether these empirical findings are also supported when using different data.  
Table 1  Expected and empirical ranking of interest organization contacts with EU 
institutions and national governments 
Political institution  Expected and empirical rankings of interest organizations 
All EU institutions  1. Firm > EU associations > National associations 
European Parliament  2. EU association > National association > Firm 
3. EU association = National association > Firm 
European Commission  2. Firm > EU association > National association 
3. EU association > Firm > National association 
Council of Ministers  2. National association > EU association > Firm 
3. National association > Firm > EU association 
Note: 1. xxx, expected ranking, 2. Bouwen expected ranking 2002b: 17, 3. Bouwen empirical ranking 
2002b: 24.  
The empirical analysis 
The Data 
These hypotheses shall be tested in a study that combines Lijphart’s comparable cases 
research strategy (1975) with statistical methods. Important context variables are controlled 
by focusing on a particular category of collective actors in EU member states with several 
common features. The cross-sectional analysis is based on a survey which was conducted 
between June 1998 and March 1999.
3 The survey focused on two classes of actors. It 
addressed 1,998 German, French, British, and EU business associations and asked them to 
specify their patterns of interest intermediation. In addition, 68 large firms in these countries 
have been questioned. Due to its large size and broad sectoral coverage,
4 the analysis gives 
a good indication of the cumulative responses of business interests to European integration 
after almost 50 years of the integration process. But note that there is no time series data 
                                                       
3   The sample is based on the following sources: Oeckl 1996, Conseil National du Patronat Francais (1997), 
Henderson and Henderson (1995), European Commission (1996). 
  14available (yet) on this topic and that only few questions in the questionnaire cover the time 
dimension. Overall, 834 responses were received (see table 2). Excluding international 
associations, the rate of return was 40.9 per cent, and the return rates for the different sub-
groups ranged from 32.3 per cent in the case of the French associations to 50.0 per cent in 
the case of the large firms.  
Table 2   The rate of return of the survey  
  EU  
 asso-
ciations 
German 
asso-
ciations 
British 
asso-
ciations 
French 
asso-
ciations 
Multi-
national  
firms 
Total 
Trade associations 
addressed 
 
420 
 
727 
 
501 
 
350 
 
68 
 
2066 
Questionnaires returned  185 322 206 113  34  860 
Questionnaires excluding 
international associations 
162 321 204 113  34  834 
Rate of return excluding 
international associations 
40.8 44.2 40.9 32.3 50.0  40.9 
 
The sample excludes public interest groups because their organizational logic differs to some 
extent from that of business interest groups (Offe and Wiesenthal 1985; Olson 1965). 
Instead, the study focuses on producer and employer associations. This means that the 
largest family of interest organizations active at the EU level is covered: about 80 per cent of 
the EU associations are business interest associations (see European Commission. General 
Secretariat 2002). 
The focus on the large member states - France, Germany and the United Kingdom – holds 
important background conditions fairly constant: these are the country size, the level of 
economic and technical development, the relevance of these countries in EU decision-
making, their formal decision rights, and their long duration of EU membership. Therefore, 
the findings presented here cannot be easily translated into the contexts of the worse-off 
member states (Portugal, Spain, and Greece) whose economic structures diverge somewhat 
or into the contexts of those member states that entered the European Union only in 1995 
(Sweden, Finland, Austria) because these were only recently exposed to the full influence of 
the European Union. Evidently, this holds all the more for the new member states of the 
Eastern enlargement. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
4   Economic branches from agriculture, industry, and services are included. The largest branch is trade with a share 
of 13.8% of all associations. 
  15The access patterns 
I test the presented hypotheses by comparing the mean access of the interest organizations 
to the EU institutions. T-tests (pairwise comparisons) compare the mean access of each type 
of interest organization – EU associations, national associations, and large firms – to different 
EU institutions (H 1 – H 3). Analyses of variance identify whether the mean access to each 
EU institutions differs across the different types of interest organization (H 4 – H 5). They are 
supplemented by pairwise post-hoc comparisons (not reported) that identify the significant 
differences. Access has been measured on a six-fold scale that includes the following 
classes: no contacts, annual contacts, half-yearly contacts, quarter-yearly contacts, monthly 
contacts, weekly contacts.  
Figure 1 illustrates the average access of the firms and the associations to the EU 
institutions. All types of organizations maintain significantly more contacts with the 
Commission (at working level) than with the MEPs and the position holders in the Council of 
the EU, confirming H 1: Perhaps not surprisingly, this confirms that the European 
Commission is the most frequent addressee of interest group demands at the EU level. 
Contacts with the officials at the working level outnumber the contacts with the political 
leadership of the Commission and the Council, confirming H 3. However, H 2 is not 
empirically supported: Whereas both EU and national associations have more frequent 
contacts with the European Parliament than with the Council of the EU which was expected, 
this is not true for large firms. They present their arguments as often to the EP committees as 
to the Council machinery. 
The hypotheses about the importance of the organizational form and the location in the 
institutional setting find only partial empirical support: As expected (H 5), large firms and EU 
associations maintain clearly more contacts with the EU institutions than national 
associations. The EU institutions are more dependent on the technical information and 
economic clout of firms and on the European encompassing interests of EU associations 
than on the ‘domestic encompassing interest’ of national associations. Many large firms and 
EU associations have become regular interlocuters of the EU institutions, whereas most 
national associations maintain only occasional contacts with them. Large firms maintain more 
contacts with the EU institutions than national associations because these mobile and 
resourceful actors are able opt out of their domestic contexts whereas most national 
associations remain tied to them. EU associations communicate more frequently with the EU 
  16institutions because they serve as European information brokers and act as interest 
intermediaries for their members.  
However, contrary to H 4, firms do not interact more frequently with the EU institutions than 
EU associations. While they have much better access to the EU Council than the EU-wide 
associations, they do not have more contacts with the Commission officials and the 
parliamentary committees than the Eurogroups.
5 Even when taking into account the relatively 
small number of firms in the EUROLOB survey, the differences among firms and EU 
associations are less pronounced than the characterizations of the EU as a system marked 
by elite pluralism would suggest. Both firms and EU associations have become regular 
interlocuters of these EU institutions. However, the firms have significantly better access to 
the Commission’s leadership and to EP members than the EU associations, indicating 
important intra-institutional variations. It must be borne in mind, though, that the contact 
density of the firms with the Commissioners and their Cabinets, the Members of the 
European Parliament, and the Council is rather low in comparison with that at the working 
level. In correspondence with H 3, the bulk of their political activities are devoted to 
influencing the details of EU legislation.  
In sum, the decision-making rationality varies both across the EU institutions and within each 
institution: The political clout of firms counts more in the higher echelons of the Commission, 
among the MEPs, and within the EU Council than among the policy experts in the 
Commission and in the Parliament. The latter are also open to the information provided by 
EU associations. These act and speak for their EU-wide constituencies and provide 
information about their ‘European encompassing interest’ outweighing the expert information 
and the investment power of large firms. Access to the higher strata of the EU institutions is 
more selective and, for the most part, restricted to the corporate actors. Firms have roughly 
similar access to the parliamentary and executive institutions at each level. Even though this 
pattern depends partly on the greater specialization of Eurogroups on interest representation 
than is common among national associations (Greenwood 2002), this finding puts the 
characterizations of the EU political process into perspective. In fact, it suggests that ‘elite 
                                                       
5   ANOVAs for access to EU institutions by firms and associations: European Commission working level: F 56.109 
df between 4, df within 829, p .000; European Commission leadership: F 52.172 dfb 4, dfw 829, p .000; European 
Parliament F 31.874, dfb 4, dfw 784, p .000; Council of the EU F 36.525 dfw 4, dfb 759, p .000. Post-hoc comparisons 
indicate significant differences for all institutions among EU associations and firms, on the one hand, and national 
associations, on the other. There is just one significant difference among national associations: the mean access of German 
and British groups to the working level of the Commission differs. The post-hoc comparisons do not indicate significant 
differences among EU associations and large firms regarding their access to the EC working level, but regarding their 
access to the EC leadership, the Council of the EU, and the EP members. 
  17pluralism’ is more pronounced in the member states than at the European level – no matter if 
these nations are deemed to be corporatist, statist, or pluralistic. 
Figure 1   European Union contacts among state and business (means) 
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The hypothesized the access of the interest organizations to the EU institutions (H 1 – H 3) 
has been largely confirmed. Unsurprisingly, the European Commission has proven to be the 
most important addressee of interest group demands at the EU level. Compared to the 
findings reached by early studies of EU interest intermediation (Meynaud and Sidjanski 
1971), the European Parliament draws nowadays far more attention of interest organizations 
to itself. As expected, all types of interest organizations maintain the least contacts with the 
Council. However, the expected ranking of the interest organizations found only partial 
support (H 4 – H 5): As assumed, national associations have fewer contacts with the EU 
institutions than EU associations or large firms. But the access of the large firms and the EU 
associations does not differ as much as was expected highlighting the importance of 
technical expertise, investment power, and EU-wide constituencies in EU level interest 
F assoc.  Firms 
  18representation. Moreover, surprisingly, associative interest intermediation seems to play 
greater role in EU politics than in national politics. 
The relations among EU institutions and interest organizations 
A closer inspection serves to validate these findings In what follows, I scrutinize whether the 
interest group access to information, their activities during the policy-making cycle, their 
initiation of the contacts, and their cooperation with the policy-makers support the outcome of 
the access analysis or shed new light on it. Those interest organizations that have access to 
them find it not very difficult to obtain information from the Commission and the Parliament. 
On a scale ranging from one (very difficult) to six (not difficult at all), on average, the EU 
associations score between 4.4 and 4.8. Without a noteworthy difference among French, 
German, and British groups, the national associations achieve between 4.0 and 4.4, and the 
firms have scores between 4.8 and 4.9. The access to information from the Council is much 
worse. Furthermore, there are important variations among the interest organizations. Firms 
and EU associations have better access to information from the Commission than national 
associations, and, in correspondence with the outcome of the access analysis, firms find it 
also easier to obtain information from the Parliament and the Council than the other 
organizations.  
  19Figure 2   The access to information from the EU institutions (means) 
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The activities of the interest groups across the policy-making cycle vary. Given that the 
primary task of the EU institutions is still the conception of common policies rather than their 
execution, it can be expected that the interest organizations are more active when the EU 
institutions design policy proposals and decide upon them than during the implementation 
stage. Figure 3 illustrates that it is indeed quite common for the interest organizations to 
represent their interests frequently vis-à-vis the Commission when its services devise EU 
directives and regulations.
6 However, only a minority of them is able to raise their voice 
already when the EU policy agenda is being set. Given ‘the unpredictability of the European 
policy agenda’ (Mazey and Richardson 1993: 11) this is hardly surprising: ‘the market for 
policy ideas within the EC policy process is much broader and is more dynamic than in any 
one national policy system. This is no doubt beneficial in terms of policy innovation, but the 
ensuing process is more difficult for everyone – including groups – to manage. ... new ideas 
and proposals can emerge from nowhere with little or no warning, simply because the 
                                                       
6   Associational measures for the timing of interest representation at the EU level by associations and firms: Agenda 
Setting: CHI
2 95.005 (df 8), p = .000 Cramer-V .250; Commission proposal: CHI
2  69.152 (df 8) p = .000 Cramer-V .211; 
European Parliament debate: CHI
2 47.148 (df 8) p = .000 Cramer-V .177; EU Council debate: CHI
2 32.217 (df 8) p = .000 
Cramer-V .147; Transposition: CHI
2 66.938 (df 8) p = .000; Cramer-V .209; Implementation: CHI
2  62.565 p = .000 
Cramer-V .204. 
 
  20Commission has seen fit to consult a particular group or a particular expert’ (Mazey and 
Richardson 1993: 22). Large firms and EU associations are more likely than national 
associations to deliver position papers to the EU policy-makers or give their expert opinion on 
them when the political agenda is being set and when EU policies are being formulated and 
debated. Among the national groups, German associations are earlier involved in the game 
than the other groups. French groups are basically absent from the early stage of the policy-
making process. 
Figure 3   The timing of lobbying activities at the EU level (per cent of firms and 
associations) 
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The interest group activities tend to decrease once the Commission has delivered its 
proposals to the Parliament and the Council, underlining the crucial position that the 
Commission assumes in the EU legislative process. Many associations regard the Parliament 
still as an institution that is only of secondary importance to them even if the gap to the other 
institutions has narrowed over time. By contrast, the EP draws as much attention of large 
firms to it as the Commission. Also in these stages of the policy-making cycle, the EU 
associations and firms are more vocal at the EU level than the national groups. When the 
policy proposal is discussed by the Council, national groups direct their attention to the 
national governments rather than the Council as a collective decision-making body: Only 31 
  21per cent of the German groups, 19 per cent of the British organizations, 26 per cent of the 
French associations, but 53 per cent of the large firms claim to be frequently active at the EU 
level when the Council working groups meet, Coreper debates, or the Council of Ministers 
takes its decision.  
In the final stages final stages of the policy-making cycle, these patterns do not hold any 
longer: When EU policies are being transposed into national law or implemented in the 
member states, the domestic associations and the firms are far more interested in discussing 
the details of EU legislation and the nitty-gritty of the implementation process with the EU 
institutions than the EU associations. These tend to confine themselves to influencing the 
early stages of the policy-making cycle while leaving the details of the decentralized 
transposition and implementation to their national members. 
The firms and the associations tend to initiate the contacts themselves rather than to rely on 
other interest organizations that provide links to the EU institutions or to wait for invitations to 
participate in committee meetings, hearings, or expert groups.
7 Among the EU institutions, 
the Commission involves interest organizations routinely into the policy-making process, but it 
includes only a minority of the organizations frequently in these deliberations. The EP is far 
less inclined to recruit the expertise of firms and interest organizations in its meetings and 
hearings, and this is even more true of the EU Council. The Commission includes 36 per cent 
of the EU associations and 27 per cent of the firms frequently into its deliberations. Given the 
variety of interests they confront, the EU institutions structure the participation of interest 
organizations in the policy-making process to a greater extent than national institution sso 
that they established a great variety of consultative structures (Eising and Kohler-Koch 
1999b; Mazey and Richardson 1993; 2002). 
 
                                                       
7   Associational measures for the contact initiatives at EU level: Firms or organizations themselves: CHI
2 99.049 (df 
8) p = .000 Cramer-V .252; Other interest organizations: CHI
2 26.756 (df 8) p = .001; Cramer-V .134; European 
Commission: CHI
2  67.948 (df 8) p = .000 Cramer-V .214; EU regulatory authorities: CHI
2 18.283 (df 8) p = .019 Cramer-
V .115; European Parliament: CHI
2=51.641 (df 8) p = .000; Cramer-V .188; Council of the EU: CHI
2 26.556 (df 8) p = 
.001; Cramer-V .115. 
  22Figure 4  Contact initiatives at EU level  
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These patterns correspond well with the EU institutional structure. However, their 
organizational capacities and their location in the EU multi-level system trigger some 
important variations among the firms and the associations. First of all, not only are firms and 
EU associations far more likely to start political initiatives than national associations. The EU 
institutions are also more likely to take the initiative and include them into the policy-making 
process rather than national associations. This preferential treatment is an important asset of 
the Eurogroups vis-à-vis their national members. Among these, the British associations 
attempt less often than the French and German groups to approach the EU institutions. 
Second, the EU associations rely less on other interest organizations to provide links to the 
EU institutions than the national associations and firms, confirming that several of them have 
become important intermediaries between their members and the EU institutions. Finally, the 
consultation practices of the EU regulatory authorities do not reflect the criteria of the other 
EU institutions. They consult national associations as frequently as EU associations about 
EU standards and regulations whereas they incorporate firms slightly less into these 
discussions. 
Conclusion 
The access patterns in the European Union are shaped by the salience of the contacts for 
the actors, the institutional opportunities of interest organizations and their organizational 
capacities. In many respects, they resemble the domestic processes of interest 
  23intermediation regarding EU affairs. The analysis confirmed the central position of the 
European Commission in the policy-making process and illustrated that the importance of the 
European Parliament for interest organizations has increased over time. The organizational 
capacities of the interest organizations and their institutional location were not as important 
as was expected. In particular, the differences among large firms and EU associations are 
less pronounced than was expected. Both have become regulator interlocuters of the EU 
politicians and officials whereas national associations are only infrequently in touch with 
them. Accordingly, the technical expertise and economic clout of firms matter as much to the 
EU politicians and bureaucrats as the ability of the Eurogroups to represent the interests of 
their members during the early stages of the policy-making cycle. 
More specifically, these findings differ from the results that were obtained by Pieter Bouwen. 
There are two major reasons for these differences: First of all, the different research designs 
account for the different findings: Pieter Bouwen has conducted a group comparison in which 
the EU officials and politicians were asked ‘to establish a ranking of their contacts with the 
different forms of business interest organizations’ (Bouwen 2002b: 20). This procedure does 
neither indicate how many contacts firms, EU associations, and national associations 
maintain individually with parliamentarians or politicians. Nor does it identify the central 
tendency or the dispersion of the access patterns of each type of interest organization 
because the group sizes differ and the organizations that do not maintain contacts with the 
EU institutions are omitted from the analysis.  
The exclusion of those organizations from the analysis that do not maintain contacts with EU 
politicians and bureaucrats tends to exaggerate the access of that group in which contacts 
with the EU institutions are heavily concentrated on a sub-set of organizations – namely the 
national associations. Only those national groups that evolved into multilevel players and 
represent their interests regularly at both the EU level and vis-à-vis the national institutions 
(Eising 2004) have approximately as many contacts with the EU institutions as EU 
associations and large firms. Hence, even though, according to Bouwen’s analysis, the MEPs 
may have roughly as many contacts with domestic interest organizations as with EU 
organizations, his ranking does not allow for the inference that national and EU interest 
organizations have similar access to them. Nonetheless, his analysis sheds much light on the 
overall balance of interest organizations that are consulted in the financial sector. 
Second, the studies conceptualized the access to the Council in different ways because 
Council members and officials have a dual affiliation: They are at the same time members of 
  24the EU legislative and their national governments or administrations. The EUROLOB survey 
conceived of the Council as a collective EU institution. When taking the contacts of interest 
groups with their national governments at the domestic level into account (see chapter 5), the 
ranking of the interest organizations’ contacts with the Council changes: Firms still maintain 
the most contacts with the national representatives, but they are now followed by national 
associations and only then by EU associations. This comes closer to Bouwen’s results even 
though the ranking of firms and national groups is still reversed in the two studies. In sum, 
this article puts into question the results of previous studies on the access patterns in EU 
politics. 
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